(4) TIS recovers insights from 'pre-critical' interpretation
A
major concern amongst TIS advocates is to rediscover and appropriate
for today the insights of 'pre-critical' or 'pre-modern'
interpretation. By these broad terms TIS literature tends to refer to
Patristic and Medieval interpretation, though there are
some exceptions.1
It is
recognised that there is no monolithic entity called pre-critical
interpretation; the period of time between the New Testament and the
Enlightenment was of course marked by development and disagreement.
Nevertheless, it is argued that this variety may be labelled
'pre-critical' because it designates certain features common to
interpreters that have been lacking since the turn to critical
interpretation.2
Uniting these features is the idea that theological interpretation
was the normative way in which the Bible was read before the rise of
biblical criticism in the late 1700s. Exegesis and theology were
virtually inseparable activities for pre-critical interpreters, hence
TIS is perceived as more of a rediscovery than a novel invention. But
this is not to say that TIS practitioners endorse an uncritical or
nostalgic acceptance of all pre-critical approaches to Scripture.
Instead their aim (at least in theory) is to build on the successes
of past generations while seeking to avoid its errors.3
What,
then, constitutes pre-critical theological interpretation? With
particular reference to Patristic exegesis, Brian Daley highlights
six features: (1) Conviction of the present reality of God; (2)
Presumption of a unified narrative; (3) The Rule of Faith; (4)
Scripture as a diverse yet unified whole; (5) Scripture as historical
yet meant for us; (6) Scripture as mystery.4
It is apparent that many of these features cohere with the
commitments of TIS already discussed. For some theological
interpreters such as Daly and Kathryn Greene-McCreight the lessons to
be learnt from pre-critical exegetes are primarily their seamless
integration of theology and exegesis, and their attitude of piety,
reverence and reflection.5
Other TIS writers are more concerned with appropriating pre-critical
strategies for discovering a range of 'meanings' in the biblical
text.6
This is seen to stand in opposition to the modern critical
interpretation of texts which equates meaning with the intent of the
text's author in the original historical context.7
Daly contends that the various 'post-modern' critiques of the modern
approach to texts and their meaning – especially following Gadamer
- have led to the current revival of interest in pre-modern exegesis:
'Such premodern exegesis is generally free from the judgments about
how to find the Bible's authentic meaning that seem so constricting,
so theologically inhibited and inhibiting, to many modern religious
readers.'8
Instead
of seeking one historically reconstructed meaning, pre-critical
interpreters employed various devices such as allegory and typology
for understanding Scripture. David Steinmetz offers three reasons why
such devices were used. The first is that what appears initially to
be a historical narrative may in fact contain absurdities or
contradictions if read historically, and may instead be a
metaphorical passage. Second, with recourse to only literal readings
it was deemed hard to explain the difficult relationship between
Israel and the Church, and the Old and New Testaments. Finally, while
all Scripture was given for the edification of the Church and,
according to Augustine, to nurture the virtues of faith, hope and
love, not all the biblical stories are inherently edifying. The value
in them must therefore be found on the level of allegory, metaphor
and type.9
Steinmetz qualifies these points stating that pre-critical
interpretation was not without boundaries. For example, Augustine
appealed to the literal sense of Scripture to limit the range of
possible allegorical meanings.10
Problematically Steinmetz fails to account fully for the plurality of
understandings of the term 'literal' amongst pre-modern writers, and
so this statement does not offer any real guidance about how one
should appropriate allegory.11
Moreover, the nature of allegorical interpretation (and its
relationship to typology) is by no means straightforward, and its use
requires careful qualification.12
With respect to the contemporary situation, Steinmetz contends that
the text cannot mean whatever a later audience wants it to mean. The
language of the Bible opens up a field of possible meanings and
readings that fall within this field are exegetically valid, even if
the interpretation was not intended by the author.13
But once again, Steinmetz never explains how exactly the text
constrains a field of acceptable meanings.
Similarly,
Fowl advocates the use of 'figural reading'. He begins by defining
'literal reading' as the meanings that have been conventionally
ascribed to a text by Christian communities - 'those interpretations
Christians take to be primary, the basis and norm for all subsequent
ways of interpreting the text.'14
On this basis he contends that there can be more than one literal
sense of a biblical text. For example, in the context of Isaiah the
child born of a virgin in Isaiah 7:14 seems quite clearly to refer to
the son born to Isaiah of Jerusalem (cf. Isaiah 8:1-3). At the same
time, Matthew's gospel and the Christian tradition understand this
verse to be a prophetic announcement of the coming birth of Jesus.
Both these can be considered literal senses, because the God who
inspires the words is able to make them refer to both characters.
But, Fowl states, there will be occasions when the literal sense of a
passage is inadequate for contemporary Christian living. At this
point one can use figural interpretation. Such readings, he writes,
'will use a variety of interpretative techniques to extend the
literal sense of Scripture in ways that enhance Christian's abilities
to live and worship faithfully in the contexts in which they find
themselves.'15
Fowl
follows this discussion with a somewhat tangential discussion about
good ecclesial practices that safe-guard healthy theological
interpretation. He argues that Scripture actually invites a
plurality of interpretations, and it is not difference that leads to
division but interpretation that isn't framed by certain interpretive
virtues, namely truth seeking/telling; repentance, forgiveness and
reconciliation; and patience.16
Certainly these are good qualities for anyone engaged in theological
interpretation, and they could arguably be seen as means for
regulating both the content of interpretations as well as the manner
in which interpretation is conducted. It is not clear, though, if
this is Fowl's point, and as with Steinmetz, Fowl's criteria for
embracing figural readings is conspicuously absent. He seems to
suggest that figural readings should be adopted on an ad hoc basis,
but more needs to be said to qualify when such readings are
warranted, and how best to restrain figural readings from becoming
wildly fanciful.
TIS
is right to advocate learning from pre-critical interpreters in terms
of their disposition and methods. Expressing indebtedness to
interpreters of the past and approaching them with humility and a
willingness to be instructed by them is certainly better than an
arrogant assumption of their irrelevance or lack of interpretive
sophistication.17
Nevertheless, this cannot entail an indiscriminate appropriation of
pre-critical methodology. It is also debatable whether the
reductionistic term 'pre-critical' helps or hinders discussion. TIS
would benefit from writing with greater specificity concerning
particular interpreters rather than generalisations about different
eras, and explaining in greater detail how one might constructively
utilise different interpretive devices and how their resultant
readings are to be regulated.
(5) TIS reads Scripture with the Rule of Faith
According
to critical scholar John Barton, current theological interpreters
wrongly impose theology on the Bible; their exegesis is 'controlled
by a theological or religious vision, so that the meaning found in
the text in the course of exegesis is determined by prior theological
commitments.'18
Part of the reason why TIS is open to such a charge is because of
the emphasis placed on using the 'Rule of Faith' when interpreting
the Bible. The Rule of Faith refers to an early summary of
authoritative Christian belief that was used as a confession of faith
in public worship.19
The basic contents of the Rule are found in some of the apologetic
writings of the Church Fathers, and were eventually codified in fixed
forms like the Apostle's Creed and the Nicene Creed.20
In the early Church the Rule functioned as a safeguard against
heretical influences, as Treier explains, 'The Rule of Faith enabled
the church to identify, preserve, and pass on a coherent doctrine of
God in the face of competing accounts of Christian identity.'21
Similarly, contemporary TIS writers commonly hold that the Rule of
Faith sets parameters for acceptable Christian readings of Scripture
and ensures continuity with the historic Christian tradition.22
Does
this not suggest that Barton is correct in saying that theology is
being used to determine exegesis? Green argues that it depends on
how one understands the relationship between Scripture and the Rule.
The biblical canon was not fully established at the time that the
Rule of Faith was taking shape among early theologians. In fact, the
christological lens of the Rule was one of the primary criteria for
deciding which books belonged in the canon, thus both canon and Rule
took shape in a context of mutual influence.23
Consequently, if read on their own terms and without reference to the
history and community of interpretation, the biblical texts do not
necessarily align themselves with the classical faith of the
Christian Church. The texts can be read in different ways, some of
which may even be considered 'good' readings insofar as they are
based on careful textual analysis, but this does not guarantee that
they are Christian readings.24
Green concludes that as surely as the canon and Rule were mutually
influential in their formation, so today they must also interact
mutually. Reading with the Rule is therefore an ongoing heuristic and
dialectical process that should guide but not determine the
interpretation of Scripture.25
Furthermore, the idea of the Rule is not to determine a single
meaning in the text such as the supposed 'plain sense', but to open
up a range of imaginative possibilities within certain boundaries.26
TIS
authors find further justification for the use of of the Rule in
their stated interpretative aims. As already observed, theological
interpreters read the Bible with a view to hear and know the God who
speaks through the text and to find direction for the Christian
life.27
While there are other legitimate reasons for studying the Bible, if
one is reading with the goal of finding theological truth, meaning,
and direction, criteria for appropriating such matters must be
integral to one's interpretive method.28
It is to this end that the Rule of Faith is used, thereby keeping the
biblical text within the continuing life of the historic Christian
Church.29
Unfortunately,
TIS appeals to the Rule of Faith are somewhat ambiguous on the issue
of interpretative authority. Theological interpretations are
required to land within the boundaries set by the Rule, but it is
uncritically assumed that the Rule and the creeds conform to
Scripture. For example, Green concedes that the Rule is lacking at
certain points, such as its complete silence on the life and ministry
of Jesus. But conceding that the Rule omits certain things does not
go so far as to ask whether the Rule could be genuinely mistaken on
any point. To speak of heuristic use of the Rule implies that the
Ruled understanding by which one approaches the text should actually
be deepened or even corrected dialectically by one's continued
encounter with the text.30
But despite talk of 'mutual influence', the authority of the Bible
appears to be subject to the uncritical standard of the Rule.31
This ambiguity is problematic by TIS's own conviction that the Bible
does not have the same ontology as other documents, yet the Rule is
not seriously tested against it. Moreover, merely because the Rule
and creeds enjoy the validation of widespread consensus one should be
cautious not to assume that the general consensus is always correct.32
A further query concerns major Christian doctrines that are not
addressed in the Rule but are clarified, for example, by Reformation
standards. While the Rule may set parameters on matters of
christology or trinitarian theology, it says nothing about
justification.33
Hypothetically one could read within the parameters of the Rule on
matters of the Trinity but reach an unorthodox interpretation of
Paul's teaching on justification from a Reformed perspective. Thus,
while the Rule of Faith may be necessary
for safeguarding ecclesial orthodoxy, for many Christian interpreters
it is not sufficient
in view of what it omits.
(6) TIS is primarily an ecclesial practice
The
points made thus far presuppose TIS' concern to prioritise the Church
as the locus of theological interpretation. In Reading
Scripture with the Church,
Watson observes that whatever his co-authors disagree about, at the
very least they agree that exegesis should be put back into the hands
of the Church and be ecclesially responsible. He states that
theological exegesis 'must reckon with a context in which the
scriptural texts are not
read
like other books, since issues of ultimate concern are uniquely and
definitively articulated in them.'34
That is to say, the Bible has been marked out as performing a
normative function in the Christian community, and within this
context a rich tradition of interpretation has developed. Watson adds
that his co-authors also agree that the claims of modern biblical
scholarship should be resisted if they prove incompatible with the
claims made by the ecclesial community, its canon, and its
interpretive tradition.35
Equally, Fowl writes, 'reading Scripture theologically is first and
foremost a practice of the church. It does not depend on the support
of academics for its survival. Nevertheless, disciplined, scholarly
attention to interpreting Scripture theologically can only benefit
the practice within the church.'36
This last almost offhand comment is actually considerably important.
It has already been noted that there is a discrepancy between TIS'
claims that theological interpretation is foremost an ecclesial
practice, and the fact that current TIS literature is almost entirely
the work of academics writing for academics. Fowl's remark justifies
this situation insofar as the careful refinement of theological
interpretation in academia helps cultivate greater sophistication and
depth in a church context.37
However, this assumes that those involved in TIS are being proactive
about disseminating their ideas outside of the university walls.
While acknowledging the personal involvement that TIS authors may or
may not have in church settings, the existing literature certainly
does not suggest that TIS ideas are being made available to Christian
communities, except perhaps to those fortunate enough to have a
formal theological education.38
Setting
this issue aside, at least in principle TIS is seen as an ecclesial
activity. As already indicated the Bible maintains theological
significance only in relation to the continued life of the Church, as
Robert Jenson writes, 'outside the church, no such entity as the
Christian Bible has any reason to exist.'39
Furthermore, the goal of TIS is not mine the biblical texts for
information but to facilitate communion with God and guidance for
corporate and individual Christian living – 'faithful
interpretation of Scripture requires its faithful performance.'40
One way that that the Church facilitates faithful interpretation and
performance is in communal reading. In keeping with what Treier calls
the best of pre-critical exegesis, reading for spiritual formation is
primarily a communal activity.41
Reading Scripture in community helps interpreters refine their
readings with the insight of different perspectives and restrains
readings from straying outside the parameters of broad Christian
orthodoxy. Conversely, the lone reader is unaccountable to Christian
tradition. This point is uncontroversial, but an apparent issue is
that individual church communities or even whole denominations are at
risk of confinement and introspection. Instead, Max Turner advocates
the advantages of inter-denominational discussion. For example, a
Pentecostal New Testament scholar might offer a more nuanced
pneumatology of Paul's letters than a non-charismatic scholar. On
the other hand, these same commitments may result in 'eisegesis,
selective blindness, and dubious ranking of elements as central or
peripheral.'42
In careful dialogue with representatives from other confessional
positions such problems can be highlighted and diminished.
Problematically, Turner's suggestion implies the scholarly rather
than ecclesial realm. A case could be made that the university or
seminary excels with respect to inter-denominational conversation
whereas churches often struggle, but the general point that Christian
community is advantageous for theological interpretation is certainly
reasonable.
The
advantages of reading in community could be applied to any text,
whether sacred or secular. The value of ecclesial interpretation is
not simply to expand the perspective of the reader but to enable
Christian transformation. Fowl writes, 'Christian communities, local
congregations, should be the places where Christians are formed
through word and sacrament to read Scripture in the light of their
proper ends in Christ.'43
Stated differently, the whole life of the Church should cultivate
certain character traits and interpretive habits that help people to
read Scripture theologically, and the practice itself should be
formative and transformative. An example of this might be the regular
corporate reading of the Apostle's creed in a church service, which
would cultivate a strong sense of the theological norms of 'Ruled'
reading.
One
concern with TIS' emphasis on ecclesial reading is with the use of
the term 'church'. The question 'which church?' is not mere
pedantry. Bockmuehl rightly comments that the term 'church' can be
notably abstract when detached from the life and worship of a
concrete ecclesial community. He writes, 'Whether in postliberal or
evangelical guise, fashionably mellifluous talk of “ecclesial
communities” may conveniently cloak tough questions both of history
and of tradition.'44
Similarly, Carson notes that TIS is composed of at least Roman
Catholics, confessional evangelicals, Barthians, and chastened
liberals.45
For each of these groups an understanding of the authority and
truthfulness of Scripture is rather different. For example, the
authority of the Roman Catholic magesterium is not inferior to the
authority of Scripture, which will considerably affect the way
Catholics bring theology to bear on biblical interpretation.46
The difficulty is that although TIS statements about putting the
Bible back in the Church are rhetorically persuasive, they disguise
(no doubt inadvertently) the complexity of such an appeal.
Theological interpretation may look radically different in different
Christian denominations or institutions, and further reflection is
needed to understand how they can all identify with TIS.
1E.g.
Joel Green's analysis of John Wesley: Green, Practicing,
99-121.
2Treier,
Introducing, 42.
3Fowl,
Theological, 55.
4Brian
E. Daley, “Is Patristic Exegesis Still Usable? Some Reflections on
Early Christian Interpretation of the
Psalms,” in The Art of Reading Scripture,
eds. Ellen F. Davis and Richard B. Hays, 74-80
(Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans,
2003).
5Ibid.,
87-88; Kathryn Greene-McCreight, "Introducing Premodern
Scriptural Exegesis," JTI 4, no. 1 (2010): 1-6.
6E.g.
David C. Steinmetz, “The Superiority of Pre-Critical Exegesis,”
in The Theological
Interpretation of Scripture:
Classic and Contemporary Readings,
ed. Stephen E. Fowl, 28-29 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997); Treier,
Introducing, 39-
55; Fowl,
Theological, 55-63.
7Daley,
“Patristic,” 72.
8Ibid.,
73.
9Steinmetz,
“Superiority,” 28-29.
10Ibid.,
29.
11See
Stephen E. Fowl, Engaging Scripture, A Model for Theological
Interpretation (Eugene: Wipf
and Stock,
2008), 37-40.
12Gerald
Bray, “Allegory,” in
DTIB,
ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, 34-36 (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005).
Cf.
Carson,
“Theological,” 199.
13Steinmetz,
“Superiority,” 31. For a response to Steinmetz see Daniel J.
Treier, “The
Superiority of Pre-critical Exegesis? Sic et
non,” Trinity Journal 24,
no. 1 (March 1, 2003): 77-103.
14Fowl,
Theological, 56-57.
15Ibid.,
57.
17E.g.
Frederic W. Farrar, History of Interpretation
(London: Macmillan, 1886), 8.
18John
Barton, The Nature of Biblical Criticism
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press,
2007), 177.
19Kathryn
Green-McCreight, “Rule of Faith,” in DTIB,
ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, 703 (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic,
2005).
20Ibid.
21Treier,
Introducing, 59.
23Ibid.,
72-73.
24Ibid.,
74. See also Hart, “Tradition,” 183-184.
25Greene-McCreight,
“Rule,” 704; R. W. L.
Moberly, "Biblical Criticism and Religious Belief," JTI
2, no. 1 (2008):
84.
26Kathryn
Greene-McCreight, Ad Litteram: How Augustine, Calvin, and Barth
Read the “Plain Sense” of Genesis 1-
3,
Issues in Systematic Theology
(New York: Peter Lang, 1999), 243.
27Robert
W. Wall, “Reading the Bible from within Our Traditions: The “Rule
of Faith” in Theological Hermeneutics,”
in Between Two Horizons,
eds. Max Turner and Joel B. Green, 91 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
2000).
28R.
W. L Moberly, The Bible, Theology, and Faith: A Study of Abraham
and Jesus (Cambridge: Cambridge
University
Press, 2000), 38.
29Ibid.,
43.
30Understanding
of heuristic from Lewis S. Mudge, “Heuristics,” in A New
Dictionary of Christian Theology,
eds.
Alan Richardson and
John Bowden, 254 (London: SCM Press, 1983). Cf. James D. G. Dunn,
“Criteria for a Wise
Reading of a
Biblical Text,” in Reading Texts, Seeking Wisdom,
edited by David F. Ford and Graham Stanton, 50-51
(London: SCM Press,
2003).
31E.g.
Wall, “Reading,” 102-103; Hart, “Tradition,” 185-192.
32Carson,
“Theological,” 198.
33Gregg
R. Allison, “Theological Interpretation of Scripture: An
Introduction and Preliminary Evaluation,” SBJT 14,
no. 2
(2010): 32.
34Francis
Watson, “Authors, Readers, Hermeneutics,” in
Reading Scripture with the Church,
A. K. M. Adam et al.
119
(Grand Rapids:
Baker Academic, 2006). Cf. Hays, “Reading,” 11-12.
35Ibid.,
120.
36Fowl,
Theological, 23.
37Cf.
Turner and Green, “New Testament,” 2.
38One
partially successful attempt to make TIS accessible to non-academics
is J. Todd Billings, The Word of God For
the
People of God: An Entryway to the Theological Interpretation of
Scripture (Cambridge: Eerdmans,
2010).
39Robert
Jenson, “Scripture's Authority in the Church,” in
The Art of Reading Scripture,
eds. Ellen F. Davis and
Richard B. Hays, 4
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003).
40Ellen
F. Davis and Richard B. Hays, “Nine Theses on the Interpretation
of Scripture,” in The
Art of Reading
Scripture,
eds. Ellen F. Davis and Richard B. Hays, 4 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
2003).
41Treier,
Introducing, 79.
42Max
Turner, “Historical Criticism and Theological Hermeneutics of the
New Testament,” in Between Two Horizons,
eds. Max Turner and
Joel B. Green, 58 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000).
43Stephen
Fowl, “Further Thoughts on Theological Interpretation,” in
Reading Scripture with the Church,
A. K. M.
Adam et al.
127 (Grand Rapids:
Baker Academic, 2006).
44Bockmuehl,
Seeing, 58.
45Carson,
“Theological,” 204.
46Ibid.
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